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For the last decade or two, the philosophy of the Vienna Circle has regained
much attention. is retrospective look and historical reinterpretation of
its actual doctrines resulted in a revival of interest in logical empiricism
within contemporary analytical philosophy. Under closer examination, the
Vienna Circle’s philosophy appears to be widely underestimated andmisun-
derstood. In particular, Rudolf Carnap’s—the Vienna Circle leading gure’s
—philosophical views have traditionally been represented in an oversim-
plied manner, restricted to a narrow, technical context, which lead many
to believe that Carnap was a strict logicist, who only cared about scientic
knowledge. e recent book by A.W. Carus entitled Carnap and Twentieth-
centuryought. Explication as Enlightenment discredits this view, by pro-
viding a comprehensive interpretation of Rudolf Carnap’s philosophical
views. Carus’ book, thus, not only proves the inadequacy of the standard
textbook view on Carnap’s philosophy, but also shows the viability of his
ideas and their far-reaching implications.
From the rst pages the reader notices that one of the author’s major
goals is to delineate Rudolf Carnap’s place among the thinkers of the twenti-
eth century, which justies the multidimensional scope of the book. Carus
locates Carnap’s philosophy in a broader historic-cultural context, tracing
back the gradual developments of his views and highlighting various inu-
ential factors. e book might be roughly divided into three large parts,
the rst dedicated to the cultural and intellectual inheritance of Rudolf Car-
nap, the second introduces his early philosophical thinking and the third
describes the later Carnap. Following this historical perspective enables the
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author to provide a detailed and comprehensive analysis of Carnap’s philos-
ophy, and ll in the gaps of previous research.
Importantly though, the author also takes another perspective—a tele-
ological (p. 40), more ambitious one. Carus puts together a continuous and
coherent story of Carnap’s philosophical development in the period of 1910
to the 1940-ies, outlining his gradually evolving conception of the ideal of
explication in the later years. Moreover, he attempts to show that Carnap’s
project of explication and pluralistic language engineering—which are the
major pillars of his later philosophy—are of lasting value and can serve as a
useful tool for solving long-standing philosophical problems.
Carus starts with a description of the background—both cultural and
intellectual—of Rudolf Carnap that signicantly inuenced his philosophi-
cal thinking and constituted the foundation for Carnap’s earlier philosoph-
ical inclinations. Among these pre-philosophical inuential factors, Carus
mentions Carnap’s training as a child, family traditions, socio-political ac-
tivities in the adolescence, war-experience, early scientic and philosophical
readings. To reconstruct this initial stage of the story, Carus bears on recent
historical research, but also uses unpublished archives—correspondence,
lecture notes, dras, manuscripts—of Rudolf Carnap. Moreover, Carus con-
ducted a series of interviews with Carnap’s students, former colleagues and
family members.is thorough analysis involving every dimension of Car-
nap’s life, prepares the reader, I believe, to independently uncover those im-
plicit and neglected aspects of Carnap’s philosophy that are introduced and
articulated in the later passages.
Aer accounting forCarnap’s cultural and intellectual inheritance, Carus
proceeds to the discussion of his early philosophical development.e prob-
lems that Carnap and his colleagues in the Vienna Circle tried to solve went
far beyond issues of mere academic relevance. One of the central motiva-
tions behind their philosophy was the promotion of a cosmopolitan culture,
promoting the progress of freedom (both individual and social) via better
andmore precise knowledge. In eect, one of the fundamental problems ac-
cording to Carnap was the absence of a clearly dened relation between sci-
entic knowledge and the practical—i.e. spiritual, political, social—realm.
is problem, Carus argues, goes back to the long-standing confrontation
between the tradition of the Enlightenment and that of Romanticism, i.e. be-
tween reason and intuition. In particular, the First WorldWar and the insta-
bility of the democratic societywere seen as side-eects of the absence of this
relation. is constituted the background for the Vienna Circle’s version of
the Enlightenment program and Carnap’s project of rational reconstruction
(as briey explained below), which was intended to address these issues. In
order for a democratic post-war society to survive, the conceptual structure
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of traditional society—oen ambiguous, irrational and old-dated—should
be replaced by a new one, based on the natural sciences. And it was precisely
the task of the rational reconstruction project to establish this conceptual re-
placement, and thus to establish the relation between the theoretical and the
practical realm. Carus emphasizes that these pragmatic aspects of Carnap’s
philosophical thinking have oen been ignored, and that his rational recon-
struction and Enlightenment program have thus been narrowed down to
the merely epistemological level. Carus attempts to bring the initial scope of
Carnap’s project back into discussion.
e broader Enlightenment program and its central component of ra-
tional reconstruction were fundamental to Carnap’s philosophical develop-
ment during the early Vienna period (1926–1931). ese ideas were most
comprehensively elaborated in hisDer logische Aufbau derWelt. Rational re-
construction constituted a twofold project that consisted of the clarication
of the vague concepts of ordinary language and their further reconstruction
to a more precise and correct language of science.is whole enterprise was
based on strict deduction and was aimed not only at improving natural lan-
guage, but also at providing a framework of objectivity that would enable
mankind to escape from a merely subjective worldview, based on irrational
superstitions and unreected conventions.
Did the earlier Carnapian idea of rational reconstruction succeed in es-
tablishing the general program of Enlightenment? Carus gives a negative
answer. ough, Carnap’s rational reconstruction seemed to full the rst
requirement of Enlightenment—it suggests a criterion for dening knowl-
edge (as a uniform deductive system)—it failed to establish the second, i.e.
to reconcile the theoretical and practical realms. Carnap’s attempt to for-
malize ordinary language via strict deduction has led him to several internal
technical problems that impeded Carnap from pursuing the rational recon-
struction in its initially intended way.
Obviously, a revision of his earlier philosophical project was called for.
e subsequent gradual development of Carnap’s philosophical thinking to-
wards a new and more viable version of the project signies, according to
Carus, the nal teleological stage of his philosophizing. It is noteworthy
that Carus repeatedly emphasizes that the ultimate goals Carnap wanted to
achieve remained unchanged (p. 32). He still sought to establish a clear re-
lation between the theoretical and practical dimension of human life, but
this time on completely dierent grounds. e new project was called “the
ideal of explication” and appeared to be amore elaborated, subtle alternative.
Carus admits that Carnap has not explicitly given a doctrinal expression of
this revised version of the project, partly because of his non-doctrinal per-
sonal character (p. 241). But a detailed analysis of Carnap’s philosophy and
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life enables Carus to gain insight into Carnap’s later ideal of explication.
e new project, as Carus reconstructs it, saw the central dialectical rela-
tion between ordinary (or evolved) language of speech and formal (or con-
structed) language of science as less rigid, more dynamic and relativized.
e initial radical break between these two languages was now soened and
the relation of explication between languages was seen as two-sided, equal,
dialectical interchange between the two conceptual frameworks. e gov-
erning idea of his new ideal of explication was the principle of tolerance, ac-
cording to which the language in which knowledge is to be reconstructed is
no longer xed, but can be freely chosen, whereas the criteria for this choice
are purely pragmatic—the usefulness of the language for serving some hu-
manpurposes. Hence, there is no single “correct” language of reconstruction
any more, but an “open sea” of possible candidate languages of construction
(p. 19). is yields, according to Carus, Carnap’s linguistic pluralism. e
practically chosen language becomes then the one, in which knowledge is
expressed. us, knowledge has for Carnap indispensable practical uses—
both social and individual—as the Enlightenment program presupposes. As
Carus states, knowledge shapes our practice and practice shapes our knowl-
edge in a mutual and equal way. (p. 20) Carnap’s ideal of explication makes
reason and intuition become equal partners.
is nal ideal—consisting in the creative enterprise of conceptual en-
gineering—is seen byCarus as themost benecial and strikingly novel reso-
lution of the traditional confrontation between Enlightenment and Roman-
ticism, combining the theoretical and practical dimensions of life. Our so-
cial practices and activities, moral values and communicative system can be
progressively improved to be more self-conscious and rational by a grad-
ual explicative replacement of its concepts by constructed ones, according
to our own practical purposes. And this approach constitutes, according to
Carus, the underestimated and neglected legacy of Rudolf Carnap’s philos-
ophy. Hence, Carnap seems to create a tool to achieve the Vienna Circle’s
central program of Enlightenment—the establishment of a new democratic,
conscious and rational society enlightened by scientic knowledge and thus
facilitating the reform of human mental and social life.
e reader, so far astonished with the simple and yet unnoticed solution,
might ask: what exactly makes the ideal of explication the most promising
framework to establish the Enlightenment program? And Carus is ready to
give the answer: the Carnapian ideal fulls both criteria of the Enlighten-
ment program—not only does it give rise to a criterion for dening knowl-
edge, but it also elaborates a relatively unrestricted way to reconcile the the-
oretical and practical dimensions, thus restoring the program’s consistency
and credibility.
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Once the Carnapian ideal of explication—the ultimate standpoint to-
wards which his earlier development has been progressing—is formulated
and explained, Carus proceeds with an argument proving the contemporary
viability of this project. He insists that the Carnapian ideal of explication is
capable of resolving the tension between scientic knowledge and practical
values even today, since it places the pursuit of knowledge and the pursuit of
the good in a coherent interrelation (p. 23). To make the argument sound,
Carus directly applies Carnap’s approach to solve contemporary issues at
stake. In particular, he suggests a new solution in a Carnapian explicative
style to the famous Habermas-Rawls debate, contrasting either of the alter-
native positions with the Carnapian ideal. Such implications may well lie
beyond the issues that Carnap had himself explicitly addressed, but it is pre-
cisely one of the author’s aims to uncover the hidden potential of Carnap’s
mature philosophical ideas.
Although, the sketch-analysis of Carnap’s ideal and its “revolutionary”
consequences (p. 19), that Carus suggests at the end of the book, are just a
preliminary, it might still provide the reader with a promising and thought-
provoking outlook on the resolution of long-standing philosophical and
practical problems. How credible his argument of extending and practically
applying Carnap’s ideal of explication is, is perhaps le for the reader to de-
cide. But the overall argumentative line and its exposition is clearly stated,
and consistent enough to convince even the most sceptical reader that there
is at least something in the argument that should be further considered.is
conviction, I believe, is also strengthened by the brief consideration of possi-
ble objections that might be raised in response to the Carnapian ideal. All in
all, it is true—and Carus himself agrees—that further investigation of Car-
nap’s explication project is needed (p. 308). But his major goal of reviving
the genuine philosophical doctrines of Rudolf Carnap via placing them back
into the broader multi-dimensinal context—the goal that seems naturally
to precede the more detailed articulation of Carnap’s ultimate project—has
been successfully achieved.
To conclude, Carus presents a detailed and foundational work for the
reinterpretation and evaluation of Rudolf Carnap’s philosophical commit-
ments within twentieth-century thought. One might suppose that it is the
lack of such a reliable and comprehensive interpretation that historically
caused so many misunderstandings of Carnap’s philosophy and the doc-
trines of the Vienna Circle. Carus not only corrects these past misunder-
standings, but also uncovers philosophical ideas that were previously ne-
glected or underestimated. He persuasively shows that onceCarnap’s philos-
ophy is adequately understood and situated in its originalmulti-dimensional
context, it appears to be a useful tool in solvingmany of our contemporary as
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well as long-standing questions not only in philosophy, but also on the prac-
tical side of human life. us, contrary to the typical view on Carnap as a
strict logician, interested exclusively in the syntax of the language of science,
Carus portraits Carnap as a practical-minded conceptual engineer, bridge-
builder and ingenious “forerunner of present fashions” (p. 8).is new, con-
textually based perspective on the interpretation of Carnap’s philosophy is
undoubtedly of special interest to analytical philosophers and Vienna Circle
scholars. However, due to its broad scope and combination of the historic-
cultural-philosophical issues considered, the book might be useful not only
for professional academics, but also for other readers, who seek for a com-
prehensive insight into the twentieth-century intellectual thought.
Despite the sketchy explanation of the ideal of explication itself, the book
is far-reaching, ambitious and thought-provoking. It claims to suggest a vi-
able way of creating a new kind of intellectual culture that would combine
themost recent scientic knowledge and the social-practical life into one co-
herent, mutually inuencing and progressively developing whole. is ad-
venturous and engineering spirit, manifesting itself in the belief of the con-
joint reformation of the theoretical and practical dimensions of the world,
is embodied in Rudolf Carnap. And it is this enlightened spirit that A.W.
Carus encourages us to follow.
